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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

22 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Assessment

The following items were discussed by the Community representatives at the 16 December warning meeting.

Kampuchea Settlement: Possible Shift in Vietnam's Position -- There was a review of hints that the SRV might allow the Phnom Penh regime to be broadened to include Son Sann, Sihanouk and their followers while still ruling out the DK. ASEAN interest in such a scheme seems to be limited to Indonesia and Malaysia, with Indian, and perhaps Soviet support. France may be pursuing a similar endeavor. These peace overtures from Hanoi could also be designed to sow dissention among the ASEAN countries and between ASEAN and China. The Vietnamese have yet to put forward this loose coalition proposal in any public form. Hanoi may see advantage in manifesting flexibility in its negotiating position if elements of ASEAN show willingness to meet the Vietnamese half way.



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DCID No. 1/5

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING

(Effective 23 May 1979)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12036, there is established a National Intelligence Warning System, individual components and responsibilities of which are established in Paragraph 3. The mission of the System is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence, and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.

1. *Definitions*

a. *Warning* as used herein encompasses those measures taken, and the intelligence information produced, by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the United States. It includes strategic, but not tactical warning.

b. *Strategic Warning* is intelligence information or intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against the US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not include tactical warning.

c. *Tactical warning* is notification that the enemy has initiated hostilities. Such warning may be received at any time from the launching of the attack until it reaches its target.

2. *Policy*

a. All Community organizations and personnel have substantive responsibility for the detection of developments requiring warning, especially strategic warning, and for prompt alerting, through established channels, of such developments. Nothing in this directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning in any way. Specifically, the measures contained in this directive do not require coordination or consultation when immediate warning is required.

b. The Department of Defense has unique and specific responsibilities for warning of attack by hostile forces. To carry out that specialized function, the DoD operates dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command organization and independent from the National Intelligence Warning System. These separate systems are mutually supportive, however.

<sup>1</sup> This directive supersedes DCID 1/5 effective 18 May 1976.

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### 3. Assignment of Responsibilities

a. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is assigned oversight of the National Intelligence Warning System and will exercise his authority with the advice of members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

b. There is established the position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning. His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. For organizational purposes, he will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center. He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties. The responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning are:

i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.

ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.

iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.

iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.

v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.

vi. To chair the Warning Working Group (Paragraph 3c).

vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers (Paragraph 3d).

viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff (Paragraph 3c).

ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.

x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.

xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning, including communications and dissemination of information.

xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.

xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.

xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the Deputy for Resource Management, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.

c. There is established a *Warning Working Group*, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Collection Tasking Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern to them are discussed.

d. The *National Intelligence Officers* are specifically charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.

e. The *Strategic Warning Staff* will be under the supervision of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are to assist him in his responsibilities with respect to strategic warning and to conduct research with respect thereto. It may also engage in other warning-related activities within the Intelligence Community with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Officer.

#### 4. *Community Responsibilities*

a. Each agency of the Community will establish the necessary structure and manning to carry out its warning mission and to support the National Intelligence Warning System.

b. Specific responsibilities of the Community in support of the National Intelligence Warning System are:

i. To provide full-time, highly qualified professional intelligence personnel and other support to the *Strategic Warning Staff* in consultation with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

ii. To provide to the *Strategic Warning Staff* on a timely basis all information from every source pertinent to the strategic warning mission. Information of exceptional sensitivity may, with the approval of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be provided only to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

iii. To provide appropriate representation on the Warning Working Group, and to designate an officer in each agency specifically responsible for warning matters and charged with support of the National Intelligence Warning System.

#### 5. *Composition and Organization*

a. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA.

b. There shall be an Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Either the National Intelligence Officer or his Assistant shall be drawn from the Department of Defense. The National Intelligence Officer may also be assisted by such staff as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence deems appropriate.

c. The Director, Strategic Warning Staff, shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA. He shall be directly responsible to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

d. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be co-located with the National Military Intelligence Center.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director of Central Intelligence

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NFAC NOTICE  
NO. 50-7NFAC N 50-7  
24 January 1980GUIDELINES FOR ALERT MEMORANDUMSANIO/W

Rescission: NFAC N 50-5, dated 12 March 1979

1. The issuance of an Alert Memorandum should be considered when:

- Events are moving toward a development threatening to US interests and it is not clear that senior policy officers are fully aware of the implications of such a development; or,
- Events are moving toward a development so threatening to US interests that it is desirable for the DCI to forward his assessment to senior policy officers despite their general awareness of the problem.

2. Any element of the Intelligence Community may recommend that the DCI issue an Alert Memorandum. Such a recommendation should be made to the NIO/W, who, in consultation with the appropriate NIO, will decide whether to forward the recommendation to the DCI. The final decision whether to issue a memorandum will require consideration of probability, criticality, awareness and prior reaction of the US Government, and the danger of lessening the impact by alerting too often. The memorandum should be independent of other intelligence issuances, the existence of which cannot be the deciding argument against alerting.

3. The Alert Memorandum is not a prediction. An event need only be a reasonable possibility, although in such a case the memorandum should make this clear. Moreover, the more critical the potential event for the US, the lower the probability threshold required.

4. The Alert Memorandum is not an SNIE, nor is it a situation report. It is not necessary to rehearse the evidence, nor to develop all the arguments. Rather, emphasis should be given to implications; the reader should understand why these developments could lead to serious damage to US interests.

5. If Paragraph 4 is heeded, the Alert Memorandum can be kept brief; it should be no more than 1 1/2 - 2 pages. In most cases, it need contain only four paragraphs:

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- What new developments, in brief, have caused us to issue this memorandum?
- What potential development of an alarming nature do they suggest?
- What are the implications for the US policy-maker? With what pressing new problems must he cope?
- What, in brief, is the Community collection posture? What changes in tasking have been made or may be required? (To be prepared by NITC).

In addition to the Alert Memorandum proper, a one paragraph cover memorandum addressed to the NSC will be prepared for the DCI's signature. This should contain a succinct statement of the warning message. If the NITC collection statement is of a sensitive nature, it will be promulgated to a limited audience under a separate cover memorandum.

6. The Alert Memorandum should be, wherever possible, a Community paper, issued under the aegis of an NIO. The NIO should seek as much coordination as time permits. At least telephone consultation is mandatory. The degree of coordination should be indicated in the memorandum, and any major differences of opinion in the Community should be noted. It should be kept in mind that ultimately, the DCI is responsible for warning the President. The coordination process should not be allowed to delay an Alert Memorandum beyond its usefulness. Observance of the guidelines on brevity and purpose will greatly ease the coordination process.

7. A supplementary Alert Memorandum on a crisis should be produced whenever, in the view of the DCI, the crisis has greatly intensified or changed in some especially significant way. The NIO should issue an appropriate advisory to the recipients of an Alert Memorandum whenever, in his judgment, events indicate that the crisis at hand has abated or terminated (unless that fact is apparent to all).

8. The attachment contains detailed procedures. All personnel should be aware that Alert Memorandums normally take precedence over other production.

9. When time is of the essence, any of these procedures may be bypassed.



Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.  
Director

National Foreign Assessment Center

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NFAC # 2662-88

NFIB-28.5/16


7 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Procedures for Alert Memoranda, Revised (U)

1. I have approved these revised procedures which are forwarded to you for action, as appropriate. (U)

2. This memorandum supercedes USIB-D-28.5/12 of 12 December 1975 and NFIB-28.5/14 of 18 January 1980. (U)

  
STANSFIELD TURNER  
Chairman

Attachment  
As Stated

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## PROCEDURES FOR ALERT MEMORANDA

1. The Alert Memorandum (AM) is an interagency publication issued by the DCI on behalf of the Community. In it he warns explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that may have serious implications for US interests. The AM is not a prediction that events will occur. An event need be only a reasonable possibility; in fact, the more critical the potential impact on the US, the lower the required threshold of probability. An AM is neither a National Intelligence Estimate on the one hand, nor a situation report on the other. It is not necessary to rehearse the evidence and develop arguments in detail nor is it enough merely to report the facts. The message to the policymaker should be threefold:

- In brief, what new developments have caused an AM to be issued?
- What potential outcome do they suggest?
- If not obvious to the policymaker, what are the implications if the outcome occurs; i.e., with what pressing new problems might he have to cope?

2. An AM is signed by the DCI, addressed to the National Security Council, and disseminated to members of NFIB for further dissemination within their departments and agencies.

3. An AM may be initiated by the DCI or may be proposed by an NFIB Principal, by a National Intelligence Officer (NIO), or by (or through) any other senior officer of the intelligence or foreign affairs communities. A proposal for an AM will be addressed to the DCI, the appropriate NIO, or the NIO for Warning, but the decision to issue an AM will in all instances rest with the DCI. Should the DCI decide that an AM is inappropriate having received a legitimate request to issue one, the NIO for Warning will provide the requester with an explanation.

4. Responsibility for the production of an AM will normally rest with the appropriate NIO, and he may call on any element of the Intelligence Community for support. Whenever possible, the NIO will coordinate a draft of the AM with appropriate NFIB agencies, and dissenting views, if any, will be described in the Memorandum. The DCI, however, may authorize the NIO to limit or forego coordination when time is of the essence. All AMs will note the extent of coordination within the Community.

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5. An AM will clearly indicate what special actions are being taken by the Community to ensure effective coverage of the situation, the initiation of special collection efforts, the establishment of crisis task forces, etc.

6. A supplementary AM on a crisis should be produced whenever, in the view of the DCI, the crisis has greatly intensified or changed in some specially significant way. The NIO/W should issue an appropriate advisory to the recipients of an AM whenever, in his judgment, events indicate that the crisis at hand has abated or terminated (unless that fact is apparent to all). Collection efforts arising from the issuance of the alert should also be modified or cancelled as appropriate.

7. Detailed procedures for preparation and issuance of Alert Memoranda are attached.

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